Epistemological Approaches to Social Sciences

John Stuart Mill, in his book A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843), rejected deduction as a main method of the social sciences. In this book, Mill introduced his analysis of methods appropriate for studying different scientific fields. He concluded that there are differences between physical and social sciences and that the deductive approach, while suited for physical sciences, wasn’t adequate for social sciences. To explain his position, Mill analyzed two alternative methods, which he called the geometric and the chemical. His father, James Mill, used the geometric method when he wanted to, starting from several stated axioms related to human selfish motivation, to deduce the optimum form of government. John Stuart Mill argued that his father was wrong in his approach because social and political reality is far more complex, where multiple conflicting forces have their influence. This lack of uniform determinism prevents the use of deduction in scientific analysis of society. The chemical method entails using observation and deduction to infer causal laws in complex systems (like chemistry) that are in some systemic way related to underlying physical causes. But the limitation of this method is that it can only be applied to those systems that are invariantly related to underlying causal relations, which is not the case with society, economy, and politics. Mill argues that ‘true’ causation only exists on the level of local physical events, and that human society and economy are too far removed from that type of causality and simplicity of relations. Only an eventual understanding of the causal laws that function at the level of physiology can, in the future, lead to the application of physical methods to social sciences and the unity of physical and social science.

Auguste Comte's main goal was to build a positive science of society. Comte's positivism has two meanings – the first is that scientific methods must be applied to the study of social phenomena, and the second is the view that we should use sociology to shape society positively. He believed that human knowledge could be increased only by applying a positive or scientific method of observation, experimentation, and comparison, while the historical method is a consequence of applying a comparative method to successive stages of human society. Comte introduced a hierarchy of sciences, and the sequence is the following: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. Every science depends on the one before it, and its subject is becoming more and more specific, as well as more complex and unsuitable for measuring and predicting. Sociology, according to Comte, should unite knowledge from political theory, psychology, ethics, and economics. He believed that the special scientific disciplines that examine each of these areas do not have the property of true sciences. Comte intended an integrative function for sociology, in order to eliminate the disastrous social and moral consequences of the French Revolution. Sociology was supposed to lead to ideological agreement and social balance. This would be achieved through the conscious and planned application of sociological knowledge in all aspects of social life.

Wilhelm Dilthey was an opponent of positivism in science, so he developed his epistemological approach based on hermeneutics. He believed that society could not be viewed in the same way as natural phenomena. It is not possible to document society as a social fact, nor is it possible to apply causal logic to social events. Therefore, it is impossible to create general causal and deterministic laws that would explain society. Instead of an objective study of society, Dilthey introduces the principle of a subjective approach to society. It is not possible to study society with the help of causal logic; it can be achieved only through interpretations, that is, the interpretation of phenomena. The key to his approach is the ability of the researcher to understand the inner mental states of others. To achieve scientific knowledge, it is necessary to use a combination of intuition and systematic application of interpretive methods. The experience of the researcher enables him to achieve a union of the subject and the object of research.

For Dilthey, understanding (Verstehen) means using our own mental life to connect with other people's minds. Meaning can be given to ideas, activities, or experiences. The socio-historical world represents the world of our shared experience. The meaning depends on the assumption that we all share, in essence, the same human nature. Meaning is always contextual; it represents the relationship of the whole with the parts. The process of interpretation begins with a principled understanding of the subject of study as a whole, which leads us to understand the meaning of the parts, which, in turn, allows us to see the whole more clearly. This closes the hermeneutic circle. Mentally placing ourselves in the situation of another person allows us to understand the thoughts and actions of that other person (his or her experience), but also to understand the socio-historical world.

Herbert Spencer believed that philosophy and science are separated by the fact that science has a higher level of generality. He believed that there is no essential difference between natural and social sciences because both sets of sciences respect the same logical structure. The goal of both is a causal explanation. Both types of science use observations or experiments to confirm or refute hypotheses. Causal relationships can be established only by the systematic study of empirically observable phenomena, and by rejecting or confirming hypotheses following empirical evidence. However, sociology as a science encounters three, specific to it, problems.

The first problem refers to Spencer's position that the progress of sociology is prevented by its subject itself (society), because social phenomena are very widely distributed, both in time and space, which makes it difficult to obtain data. Another problem stems from the fact that the emotions and values ​​of the sociologist always influence his approach to social phenomena. That is why it is impossible to be completely objective and impartial, so sociologists tend to look only for evidence that speaks in favor of their preconceptions. Spencer sees the third difficulty in sociological research in the fact that a sociologist studies a society, while at the same time, he is a member of that society. The positions and functions (nationality, class, religious affiliation, etc.) that a sociologist has in society inevitably affect his values ​​and emotions.

Spencer developed the rules of the sociological method that were supposed to create procedures by which to overcome these three epistemological problems of sociology. To overcome these problems, sociologists need to train their minds to think analytically, synthetically, and causally. The best way to train the mind in this way is to study biology and psychology. The use of the comparative method is the best procedure for overcoming all three problems of sociology because this method is the best for setting up inductive generalizations and hypotheses that can be tested. For Spencer, another important method is deduction, which is the verification of specific laws from simpler and more general laws, and he considered the law of evolution to be the most important such general law.

Frank Lester Ward viewed sociology in the context of a wider range of both natural and social sciences. He accepted Comte's classification of sciences, which starts from the most exact and the least complex, to the least exact and the most complex: astronomy, physics, biology, and, finally, sociology. Every more complex and less exact science requires the possession of knowledge from simpler and more exact sciences. Ward sees sociology as a science that is above all other sciences and the last level in the genesis of science. Sociology is the youngest of the basic sciences and requires a wide range of knowledge in order to draw its conclusions. Sociology represents a broad order of natural phenomena, under which we can place other social sciences: economics, ethnology, history, and demography. Sociology is not an aggregation of all special social sciences, but their specific, organic synthesis. According to its subject, psychology lies in between; that is, it includes parts of both biology and sociology. The subject of sociology is human achievements, and the focus is on function, not structure.

Alfred Weber viewed sociology as a science of culture, so he believed that the methods of natural sciences could not be applied to sociology. His opinion is that sociology can determine general concepts and regularities only by carefully studying history, that is, its unique manifestations. Historical reality can be divided into three areas: culture, civilization, and society. Throughout history, separate processes have taken place in each of these three areas. These processes can be separated in the theoretical-analytical sense, but they are, in reality, closely related. Civilization and the civilization process constitute the third key area. Weber defines and limits civilization in a very specific way, different from most other sociologists. In his approach, civilization consists of three sub-areas: the intellectually formed image of the world and the ego, the cosmos of pragmatic knowledge, and the intellectual tools for mastering life (technical knowledge). These three parts of civilization and the civilization process are only aspects of the same developmental logic. When the process of civilization begins to move in a certain direction, it continues to move strictly following that developmental logic. Knowledge and intellectual ideas that are acquired in the process of civilization are "pre-existent" phenomena. This means that this knowledge and ideas are not "created", but only "discovered". He thus wants to say that science and technology only reveal facts about the outside world, which already existed before and were waiting to be "discovered". Scientific knowledge and technical discoveries, unlike cultural emanations, can be fully transferred to other historical areas. The only preconditions for the spread of civilizational knowledge are sufficient psychological (civilizational) development of another historical organism, which adopts new knowledge or technology, as well as the existence of mutual communication between two historical organisms. The process of civilization, in the end, will lead to a single world civilization.

Max Weber argued that social sciences study values ​​and meanings, and they should be used to understand and interpret subjective human behavior, while the natural sciences aspire to establish general deterministic relations. Thus, the social sciences study what is unique and unrepeatable in a culture at a certain historical moment. Weber takes the view from formalism that it is necessary to develop and systematize generalized social forms, which he did by developing an "ideal-type approach" and creating many classifications. On the other hand, Weber partially takes over the premise of historicism about the essential difference between the social and natural sciences. Weber also believes that it is necessary to understand individual psychological motives, goals, and values, but also to interpret and document culturally and historically unique phenomena.          

Weber believes that the goal of social science is to build a network of abstract concepts and to investigate objectively existing causal relationships in individual events. Through the study of causal relationships in individual events, we can determine general social rules. The starting point for studying individual events is human "social action". Social action is any behavior that has meaning for a person who performs a social action and includes failing to perform an activity, as well as suffering from an external situation. Another condition for a behavior to be viewed as social action is that the actor must take into account the behavior of others and coordinate his social actions with it. Human social action is the only thing we can really understand because it has its objective, external side, which we can directly observe, but also because it has an internal, subjective side, which we can understand and interpret. That is why social action is the basic unit of sociological analysis.

Human social action is voluntary; however, it can be a product of conscious and intentional desire, just as it can be a product of unconscious motives. Unconscious motives are influenced by culture and tradition, as external factors, but also by personal emotional states, as internal factors. Weber believes that fully conscious and intentional social action is just a borderline case and that people are much more likely to act instinctively or routinely. In that sense, every social action can be directed by several different factors: values, goals, emotions, and rationality. These factors are expressed in different proportions in any particular social action of an individual, but they are also shaped in different ways by the broader cultural and historical context of social action.

The scientific study of social action requires the application of the cognitive method of „understanding“ (verstehen). Understanding is made possible by the fact that there is an identity between the subject (researcher) and the object (individual that is studied) of cognition, and therefore understanding has a higher degree of clarity and certainty compared to other forms and methods of cognition. The identity of the subject and the object of knowledge, in essence, means that scientists, as well as people whose work is the object of the study, have similar psychology. This is what enables scientists to understand the subjective meaning that social action has for the person who performs the social action. Understanding has both an intellectual and an emotional component.

This means that we can understand the rational aspect of one's social actions, while at the same time understanding the emotional motives of that social action. Understanding social action, as a sociological method, allows us to create causal explanations of individual events. On the other hand, creating causal explanations of complex processes requires the application of a comparative-historical method, while a thought experiment also serves as a research aid. A special type of sociological concept, in Weber's approach, is "ideal types". Ideal types represent abstract sociological concepts that allow us to classify the subjective side of human social action (both conscious and unconscious; both rational and emotional) according to their type into different categories. Ideal types can serve hypothetical-analytical understanding, or serve descriptive and historical explanations.

Tomáš Masaryk believed that no factor (natural or social) has a decisive deterministic and causal role in society, but that natural, social, and personal factors have an equal role in determining social development, which achieves the balance of the social system. Social dynamics and social statics are abstract sciences and represent two different sides of the same cognitive process.

Masaryk also gave his own classification and hierarchy of sciences. Sciences are, first of all, divided into theoretical and practical. Theoretical sciences are divided into abstract sciences, which study the general elements of a field of study, and specific sciences, which investigate individual phenomena within a broader field of study. The hierarchy of sciences begins with the simplest and ends with the most complex sciences. Beyond the scope of sciences is philosophy, which also contains theoretical and practical elements (ethics). In the social sphere, sociology (both dynamics and statics) is an abstract science; concrete sciences are: anthropogeography, ethnology, economics, the science of the state, the science of moral, intellectual, and artistic organization of society, history, law, and statistics; while the practical sciences are: politics, jurisprudence, practical economics, military science, etc.

Karl Popper, in the book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), moves away from logical positivism, which stressed the importance of empirical verification of scientific theories, and introduced the notion of falsification and claimed that it is the only way to truly determine whether some theory is scientific or not. According to Popper, scientists should propose theories that are designed in a way that they are easiest to refute i.e., shown to be false, by experimental or observational evidence. In order to verify the statement „all swans are white“scientists would need to check every swan that has ever existed, which is impossible; but, on the other hand, to falsify that statement, scientists only need to find one swan that is not white. If attempts to falsify a theory fail, that leads to the corroboration of that theory. The goal of experimental scientists should be to try to either falsify or corroborate a theory. Popper warns that theories shouldn’t be protected, or as he says, immunized, from falsification by the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. Logical positivism was based on inductive logic, while the process of falsification follows deductive logic.

We cannot distinguish science and non-science based on the methodology used to come to conclusions, because all empirical observations are fallible, selective, and conditional; hence we can only corroborate them if they prove not to be false. In that sense, science does not produce universal laws, but can only produce a large body of evidence that supports some generalization. All scientific statements are provisional and subject to the process of “conjecture and refutation”. Theoretical progress in some scientific fields consists of constant revisions of existing theories, rejecting falsified ones and supplanting them with more encompassing theories. In his later works, Popper rejected the theory of scientific revolutions proposed by Thomas S. Kuhn.

Popper strongly argues that theories, or even whole theoretical approaches, that cannot stand the process of falsification belong to the field of metaphysics. He thinks that psychoanalysis and Marxism belong to the category of pseudoscience, as they purport to explain everything, so they can’t be falsified. Popper does not reject all metaphysics, as some beliefs, such as those that state that nature is uniform and follows the rules of causality, although not falsifiable, are useful for science.

Popper replaced the concept of falsification, in his later work, with the broader concept of “critical examination” that could be applied not only to scientific but also to metaphysical claims. This approach became known as “critical rationalism”. Popper also explored the body-mind dualism and concluded that there exist three worlds. The first world consists of the objective reality of physical objects; the second world consists of subjective, mental phenomena like ideas and emotions; while the third world is composed of phenomena that are at the same time both objective and mental–cultural products that reach autonomy from individual minds (language, art, religion, law, institutions, etc.

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn made a distinction between normal science and revolutionary science. Normal science refers to the process of solving scientific puzzles within an established paradigm. A paradigm encompasses the shared assumptions, values, methodological approaches, beliefs about the natural world, symbolic generalizations such as Newton’s laws, and exemplary studies or experiments accepted by a scientific community. During periods of normal science, researchers interpret observations in accordance with the prevailing paradigm, and evidence that appears to contradict it does not necessarily undermine their commitment. Scientists typically attempt to resolve such inconsistencies within the existing framework. However, when persistent anomalies resist explanation, they may eventually lead to a scientific revolution. During a successful revolution, an established paradigm is replaced by a new one that rests on substantially different assumptions and exemplars. Kuhn further argued that competing paradigms in revolutionary periods are incommensurable, meaning that they cannot be compared or evaluated solely through empirical evidence and formal decision-making rules. Consequently, the choice between competing paradigms involves factors beyond purely objective scientific criteria.

In Cultural Materialism (1979), Marvin Harris tries to show how his paradigm relates to the philosophy of science and the structure of scientific theory. He believes that most scientific theories in all sciences contain a combination of inductive and deductive approaches, which Harris accepts as the most fruitful scientific approach. Karl Popper introduced into epistemology the difference between the verification of hypotheses and their falsification. Considering that if a hypothesis can be falsified, then it has scientific validity; otherwise, it is a tautology that cannot be disproved. On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn believed that normal scientific processes do not function on the principle of falsification, but take place on the level of paradigms - a set of laws, theories, applications, and methods shared by a group of scientists in a certain period. Harris believes that Imre Lakatos found a solution to the conflict between Popper's and Kuhn's approaches to science. Lakatos believes that one cannot claim that an isolated scientific theory is unscientific, as that can be said only about a series of related theories. Harris believes that the history of science consists of a struggle between conflicting research paradigms. The scientific validity of each paradigm is evaluated by the validity of the theories that arise within its framework, which ultimately leads to scientific progress.

In his book Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science, George Ritzer assesses the applicability of the concept of paradigm, which Thomas Kuhn introduced to the philosophy of science, to sociology. Ritzer concludes that sociology is divided into three fundamentally different paradigms: 1) a paradigm of social facts that is focused on large social structures and external limiting factors (norms and values); 2) a paradigm of social definitions that studies how actors define their own social situation; 3) a paradigm of social behavior that explores the social causes and consequences of unconscious human behavior.

David Willer, in his first book, Scientific Sociology: Theory and Method (1967), proposed the construction of theoretical sociology based on the application of mathematical models in the development and application of scientific sociological laws. Such scientific laws cannot be constructed by generalizing empirically obtained data. In his book Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudo-Science (1973), Willer, precisely because of the wide application of empirical generalizations, characterizes sociology as a pseudo-science. He believes that sociology can be a science only if it develops precise theories that can be tested empirically.

Immanuel Wallerstein contends that his world systems approach functions more as an epistemological perspective than as a macro theory. He rejects universalist theoretical explanations and promotes the historicity of all social sciences. Wallerstein also rejects the supposed opposition of nomothetic aistorism, on the one hand, and ideographic historicism, on the other. Both of these epistemological approaches need to be combined into a perspective he calls the "historical system" in order to advance science.

Pierre Bourdieu most consistently set out this theoretical approach in his books Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (1977, in French 1970), Outline for a Theory of Practice (1977, in French 1972), Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment Taste (19894, in French 1979), and An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1992). The epistemological basis of Bourdieu's approach is based on his tendency to overcome binary oppositions (dichotomies) prevalent in social sciences: subjectivism/ objectivism, physicalism/psychology, structure/actors, theory/empiricism, micro/macro, causal explanation/interpretive explanation, materialism/idealism, methodological individualism/methodological holism, etc. The apparent dualism of these paired concepts is caused by social factors, that is, intellectual rivalry, which produces a narrow and rigid division between scientific disciplines, subdisciplines, and theoretical directions. Bourdieu's solution to overcoming these divisions is to use a truly critical and reflexive social science that will always pay attention to the socio-political context, especially the power relations within which scientific research is conducted and the context that affects the subject of study. This approach requires a critical and reflexive attitude towards theory and methodology, but also towards the practices of the people who are the subject of research. The essence of this "reflexive" epistemology is the constant, systematic, and strict use of self-criticism and introspection of scientists who study society. All cultural symbols - art, food and clothing patterns, science, religion, language - serve to pursue the interests of those in power. Those at the top of the hierarchy of a field use symbols to preserve, increase and legitimize that power, so such strategies are a source of symbolic power and symbolic violence.

Roy Bhaskar, in A Realist Theory of Science (1975), proposed an ontology that distinguishes three spheres:  the real, the actual, and the empiric. He states that there are structures or hidden mechanisms that we can empirically research in closed and open systems. He contended that the success of laboratory experiments in physical sciences is due to the creation of artificially closed systems that can be freely manipulated and where causal and deterministic relationships could be explored and isolated. Bhaskar argues that closed systems of this type are rare outside the laboratory and that kind of experimentation would not be applicable to social sciences. Critical idealism, in that sense, positions itself between idealism, on one side, and materialist empiricism, on the other side. Bhaskar states that society consists of an enduring set of structures that are positioned in complex stratified relations. Those structures and their relations are not constant, as they are continually changing, either by being reproduced or inadvertently or consciously changed. The social structures are real and possess causal power, but those powers practically and conceptually function differently than in natural sciences.

In the books Involvement and Detachment. Contributions to the Sociology of Knowledge I (1987, in German 1983), An Essay on Time: Contributions to the  Sociology of Knowledge II (1991, in German 1984), and The Symbol Theory (1991), Norbert Elias develops his own sociology of knowledge. Early historical phases of social development were characterized by animistic, magical, and mythical ideas and feelings, as well as the great "involvement" of the person in these fantastic ideas and performances. Over time, there was a gradual development of "detachment", which enabled the creation of knowledge that could more adequately describe and control the forces of nature. On the other hand, the social sciences have failed to separate themselves from the "social forces" that continue to shape those sciences. Elias advocates for the development of scientific procedures and conventions that would isolate knowledge about society from social forces and enable the creation of practical sociological knowledge.

Philip Abrams, in his book Historical Sociology (1980), stated that history and sociology are, in essence, the same sciences and that the institutional arrangement of the social sciences influenced the creation of an apparent difference. History tends to study individual problems and be an individualizing (ideographic) science, while sociology tends to be a generalizing (nomothetic) science, but, in essence, the difference is more in emphasis than in method.

                          Marxist Approach to Science

Karl Marx argued that social relations of production are never arbitrary and random but depend on the stage of development of „material productive forces“. Material productive forces are determined by the level of technological and scientific development and technical organization of the production process, on the one hand, as well as raw materials, land, and other natural preconditions of production, on the other hand. Social relations of production are relations that people enter into in order to produce goods. Social relations of production consist of rules governing the ownership of the „means of production“, which consists of „means of labor“ (land, tools and machinery, buildings, etc.) and „objects of labor“, as well as rules governing the „productive forces“. The productive forces are the people who do the work, and throughout history, the legal relationships that have regulated their work have changed. In slavery, the productive forces had the status of slaves, while in capitalism the productive forces have the status of free people who rent their labor to the owner of the means of labor, and in return receive a salary. All these „factors of production“ are the result of a long historical development of technology and economy, and therefore, they are not freely chosen by the people.

Such relations of production form the economic „base“ of society (Marx uses the German term basis, but in the English language this term is translated in different ways - as „structure“, „substructure“, or „base“; which are all synonymous), and that economic base has a key influence on the shaping of the social „superstructure“ (Überbau). The social superstructure consists of social consciousness, the legal and political way of organizing society, art, ideology, etc. When, at some historical moment, the development of material forces of production exceeds the existing relations of production, then conditions are created for a change in the relations of production, and this leads to their sudden change. Marx calls such sudden changes "social revolutions." After the transformation of the relations of production, gradually, but inevitably, the entire social superstructure is reshaped.

Lukács believes that bourgeois science constantly observes phenomena from the point of view of the individual and that such a view cannot produce knowledge of totality, but only fragmentary knowledge. That is why bourgeois science divides totality into several special sciences. The fragmentation that occurs with the subject is conditioned by the fragmentation of production, the division of labor, and the hierarchical structure of the labor market. It is the logic of capital that creates consciousness, not individual perception or understanding. Lukács intended to create a philosophical basis for the establishment of true revolutionary class consciousness, so he wants to overcome Kant's view according to which it is not possible to achieve objective knowledge of reality. Social and historical facts gain real meaning only when they are integrated into the whole (totality). Only subjects, who are totals themselves, can understand totality, and in modern society total subjects can only be classes. The category of totality is the essence of the revolutionary principle in science.

In his book Reason and Revolution (1941), Herbert Marcuse explores the dialectical method of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Marx. He believes that Marxism stems from the legacy of German idealism, in which a critical conception of the world emerged. The world is full of banalities and lies, so philosophy must, with its critical power, take off that mask and reveal the true image of the world, which is characterized by human suffering and injustice, and false beauty. Negation is the most important feature of dialectics because it reveals facts about reality that call into question the existing order. In this book, Marcuse criticizes positivist science because it identifies with facticity, scientism, and conservatism. 

In his early works, the most important of which is Traditional and Critical Theory (1937), the author deals with the problem of science. He critically studies the methodological, theoretical, and practical aspects of science. Horkheimer rejects both positivist and pragmatic views on science because they do not pay enough attention to the social crisis and the problems of human existence. Science is neither capable nor ready, in a period in which there are social problems and economic crises, to deal with the elimination of social misery. Scientific truth cannot be separated from moral questions, so bourgeois science itself acts as an ideology. Scientific perception is always mediated by social categories, and those categories lead to the "reification" of society. Critical theory, in contrast, is conceived as an autonomous practice that should transform culture and society. Autonomous practice is guided by emancipatory principles; that is, it strives to achieve universal and authentic emancipation of all people, regardless of class and group interests. Only in such a rational world, free from reification, is it possible for science to be guided by the principles of positivist science.

In the book Dialectics of Enlightenment (1972, in German 1947b), co-written with Theodore Adorno, the authors explore the history of bourgeois society and culture, primarily in the context of the Enlightenment ideas of science and humanism. The Enlightenment is the product of a dialectical relationship between the ideas of freedom, justice, and personal autonomy, on the one hand, and the values ​​of positive science focused on measurements and exactness, as well as pragmatism and utilitarianism, in order to control nature, on the other. The Enlightenment was a period in which the preconditions of "totalitarianism" emerged because the principles of positive science were applied to exert control over society. These principles led to the spread of ideas and practices of order, control, and domination, while at the same time eliminating mythical thinking and subjectivity. In the modern society of advanced capitalism, proletarian revolutions have not taken place.

In Western culture, as a consequence of the Enlightenment, the instrumental form of formal rationality dominates, and the goal of that rationality is to achieve control over human action and society, through dehumanized science and technology. Capitalist societies, through the culture industry and dehumanized science and technology, destroy any real opposition by either assimilating or neutralizing it. In these societies, all models of social communication become monolithic and lead to cultural indoctrination. Modern society is becoming an iron cage of total administration, consumerism, and resignation.

Harry Braverman is known for his significant work Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974), in which, within the Marxist paradigm, he studies how the work of manual workers has changed since the time of Karl Marx. The main conclusion of his study is that there was a massive decrease in the skills and knowledge of manual workers in the sphere of industrial production in the twentieth century. The main method by which the deskilling of workers was achieved was by the application of principles of Taylorism, or scientific management. Taylor wanted to achieve the highest possible productivity of labor by applying scientific methods, and he hoped that everyone, including workers, would see the rationality of his approach. The basic principles of Taylorism are the separation of the work process from the skills of workers, the separation of ideas from execution, and that all mental work should be removed from the plant and concentrated in the planning department, in order to use the knowledge monopoly to control every step of the work process. Braverman believes that the scientific management movement is of invaluable importance in shaping modern corporations and that it rules the world of production. Experts in human relations and industrial psychology are becoming a service department for the maintenance of human machinery. Taylorism has brought control over workers and the work process to a whole new level. In addition, the increase in productivity achieved by Taylorism did not lead to a proportional increase in wages; on the contrary, there was a reduction in wages. Braverman believes that the loss of control, knowledge, and reduction of wages that workers have experienced is the essence of Taylorism.

                                  Feminist Approach

Donna Haraway argues that scientists began to study primates in order to better understand our species, and they were especially interested in how much our society is determined by our innate (primate) nature, and how much by culture. Primatology, but also the whole of science, is not able to get rid of the prejudices that people have about culture, nature, and gender. Science is not able to build unique knowledge that is not conditioned by social institutions, relationships, and values. In addition, science has most often served to justify and strengthen existing social hierarchies. That is why Haraway advocates situational knowledge and gives priority to different perspectives that arise within different communities. Science should be the product of a specific context and a specific moment. The author also criticizes standard science for its constant need to introduce dichotomies, such as culture/nature, male/female, man/animal, and man/machine. Haraway thus joins other postmodern epistemologists who advocated the multiplicity of perspectives and criticized the futility of building a completely "objective science". She believes that cultural prejudices around gender have had a key impact on the creation of scientific knowledge. Sexist prejudices have contributed to the misrepresentation of female physiology and psychology. In addition, these prejudices led to the creation of reductionist theories instead of holistic gender theories.

Dorothy Smith, after studying the ways of acquiring knowledge about society, concluded that, although official sociology is presented as a rational and objective science, sociology, at the same time, excludes the experience of women and thus provides a distorted picture of social relations. Sociological knowledge is gained from the positions and views of men and creates, as the author calls them, "relations of ruling", which are a set of organized practices and discourses of the state, companies, and professional and educational organizations, which permeate multiple locations of power. Sociology overlooked both the female experience of everyday life and the female position within the macro context of capitalist society.

Smith sees sociology as an ideological project that marginalizes the concept of gender order in order to maintain the patriarchal nature of society. She proposed an alternative, a sociology based on the positions and views of women (standpoint of women). This sociology takes into account the everyday life of women, but also the innate relations of ruling that are maintained through institutions and shape that everyday life. In the context of this view of sociology, Smith developed the concept of "institutional ethnography", which represents a methodological strategy for the sociological research of women. Although her theory shares some of the ideas of postmodernism, she criticizes the postmodernist rejection of the search for scientific truth. Theorists in science, economics, and information dominate empiricists and create a class of knowledge. At the heart of post-industrial society is a professional class that embodies the norms of social responsibility and ethics of community service.      

Sandra Harding singles out five areas that feminist science must focus on: 1) gender inequalities in education, research funding, and careers; 2) abuse of science to support sexism, heterosexism, racism, and ideologies of inequality; 3) problematization of the idea of ​​pure science, and especially the idea of ​​gender-neutral science; 4) the impact of culture on science; 5) creating an alternative feminist epistemology. She suggests building "feminist empiricism" as an alternative to classical science. She stands for a science that will fight for equality, diversity, and solidarity. Harding belongs to a group of feminists who advocate the epistemology of standpoint theory. This epistemology starts from the assumption that women's multiple and contradictory identities and social positions should serve as an epistemological resource. True knowledge can only be created by studying the oppressed and deprived, as well as by examining a specific female experience that is very different from the experience and worldview that men have. The different experiences and worldviews that women have allow us to create a specific insight into the way society works. She sees gender as a product of experience and practice. Gender differences in identities, experiences, and practices cause gender differences in knowledge.

                           Historical Development of Science

Robert Merton, in Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-century England (1936), hypothesized that the development of an experimental approach to the study of the natural sciences, and the scientific revolution, was a consequence of the Puritan religion. The Puritans wanted to, by researching the empirical world, discover the rules by which God arranged the natural world. With time, as science gained its institutional legitimacy, it severed ties with religion. Merton believed that the future of science depended on the spread of democracy and liberalism, and that the scientific ethos was, in a small way, an example of a democratic ethos. The scientific ethos is based on the values of: "universalism" (objectivity and impartiality), "communism" (scientific knowledge is generally good), "disinterestedness" (absence of any interest in science, other than the desire to know), and "organized skepticism" (necessity to always doubt and seek verification).

Ben-David argues that national differences in how science is organized influence scientific productivity. Germany and the United States achieved greater scientific productivity than Britain and France partly because their universities had more competition. In the United States, productivity was further supported by a decentralized scientific system, large and diverse research groups that encouraged collaboration, and less authority held by senior scientists over younger researchers.

                            Sociology of Science

Competition is a defining feature of scientific research in the United States, particularly among universities and individual researchers. Universities compete for prestige, funding, and research resources, while scientists strive for recognition by being the first to make important discoveries. Since research outcomes are difficult to measure directly, departmental prestige is often assessed through faculty surveys. Highly prestigious departments generally attract more resources and demonstrate greater research productivity. However, competition can encourage secrecy, premature publication, and the pursuit of less crowded research areas.

Scientific productivity is distributed unequally, with a small proportion of researchers producing a large share of publications and receiving most citations. Although men have historically been more productive than women, this difference is largely explained by variations in professional backgrounds and institutional circumstances. In the United States, productive scientists often move to more prestigious institutions and higher positions. At the same time, working in prestigious institutions can further increase productivity by providing better resources and opportunities. This process illustrates, what Merton called the “Matthew effect,” whereby successful researchers gain advantages that reinforce their future success, causing inequalities to grow throughout their careers.

Scientific disciplines also differ in their levels of agreement about theories and research methods. Fields with greater consensus tend to offer clearer standards for evaluating research, potentially making early career success easier. In contrast, disciplines with less agreement may have higher journal rejection rates, reflecting greater disagreement over the quality of research.

Furthermore, disciplines vary in how much researchers depend on one another’s work. Empirical sciences generally demonstrate greater interdependence than mathematics, where researchers tend to cite fewer other studies. This difference reflects varying levels of collaboration and intellectual connection across scientific fields.

                             Laboratory Research

Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar collaborated in developing an anthropological research model adapted to the study of the production of scientific and technological knowledge. In Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (1979), they studied various activities that scientists carried out in a laboratory. The basic theoretical approach of the research was the hypothesis that scientists actively produce the boundaries between science and society, using different resources in different situations. Using this approach, they found that scientists, in order to be successful in their work, establish connections with actors who possess power; in addition, scientists need to increase scientific credibility, that is, scientific capital. These connections and capital must continue to be constantly strengthened to maintain the strength of the bond within the "network". Latour and Woolgar (1979) describe how facts were socially constructed. For example, initial claims constitute conjectures, and lower-order factual statements are qualified by the names of those making the claims. However, when they are successfully constructed, these qualifications are dropped, and the facts are taken for granted, perhaps embedded in laboratory equipment or algorithms. Related work by other sociologists has involved detailed analyses of scientific discourse.

Knorr-Cetina began her research by studying the work of scientists in the laboratory, and that experience, together with the theoretical influence of symbolic interactionism, social constructivism, and phenomenology, led her to create her theoretical perspective, which she called "postsocial theory". Within the laboratory, or as she calls it, "epistemic culture", post-social relations arise between the post-social self and the "object of knowledge", so the self and the object become mutually connected. Later, she extended post-social relations to the relations of people with consumer goods or technology. She believes that post-social relations, therefore, face-to-face relations, are replaced by the relationship of people with objects. Recently, Knorr-Cetina has focused on studying the information architecture of global financial markets, as well as the global social and cultural microstructures that these markets create. She believes that the micro-sociological approach is the best basis for understanding macro-social structures and institutions, so in her study of globalization, she starts from a micro-sociological ethnographic perspective.

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